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Modernity’s Opiate, or the Crisis of Iconic Architecture Log 26 
Simone Brott  
 
Theodor Adorno was opposed to cinema because he felt it was too close to reality, and 
thus an extension of ideological capital.1 What troubled Adorno was the iconic nature of 
cinema – its ability to mimic the formal visual qualities of its referent.2 For the postwar, 
Hollywood-film spectator, Adorno said, “the world outside is an extension of the film he 
has just left,” because realism is a precise instrument for the manipulation of the mass 
spectator by the culture industry, for which the filmic image is an advertisement for the 
world unedited.3 Mimesis, or the reproduction of reality, is a “mere reproduction of the 
economic base.”4 It is precisely film’s iconicity, then, its “realist aesthetic . . . [that] 
makes it inseparable from its commodity character.”5 
Adorno’s critique of what is facile in the cinematic image – its false immediacy – 
glimmers in the ubiquitous yet misunderstood term “iconic architecture” of our own 
episteme. For iconic architecture is not a formal genre or style so much as it is a rebuke. 
In the unfolding global financial crisis of the present moment and 11 years after the 
destruction of the World Trade Center towers in New York, the “iconic” is viewed by 
many ambivalently, perhaps with a degree of shame and hypocrisy. Iconic architecture is 
loosely aligned with the cult of the architectural image that, in today’s globalized culture 
industry, accords fame to any number of brave buildings – the CCTV headquarters in 
Beijing, the Gherkin in London, or the Dancing Towers in Dubai, to name only a few – 
by the distribution of computer-generated imagery prior to their construction and 
completion. 




To those within the discipline, such buildings are implicitly defined by way of a 
dead-on iconicity: the uncanny surface resemblance between the built work and its fake – 
or simulated – reality in the digital model that is both the building’s identical twin and its 
exalted reason for being. The “virtual” twin exists eternally in a four-dimensional 
computer coordinate system that is the sine qua non of formally complex, dazzling 
geometries that previously could scarcely have been conceived, let alone constructed. 
Such architecture now depends on mimetic media, on computer visualization, to see what 
the architects and the “masses” themselves cannot see with their own eyes and to 
fabricate what they cannot build with their own hands.  
If cinema is too close to reality, Adorno would have surely said that iconic 
architecture is too close to virtual reality. Frank Gehry’s Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao 
induces both amazement and terror precisely because it incarnates and materializes 
before one’s eyes a humanly ungraspable geometry of a surreal order on the ground. To 
the spectator, the building’s reality converges on a virtual image that hovers in space, its 
presence only felt in the infinitude of choice that flickers in the plastic surface (not only 
the kaleidoscope of “views” or permutations of the digital surface, but also the splintering 
of the subject itself). The subject faced with an infinity of choice is paralyzed, like any 
consumer. This mimetic apparatus is irreducible to a semiological or phenomenal relation 
between the building and its virtual model, even one indexically hitched to a real surface. 
For the purpose of iconicity is not mere deception but rather the installation of a new 
subjectivity in the social encounter with the architectural commodity, the magic of which, 
in Marxian terms, is its simultaneously “sensual” (present) and “hypersensual” 
(transcendent) quality.6 Like Adorno’s film spectator, our experience of the iconic is a 




guilty mix of pleasure and anguish felt in the auratic presence of a technological 
apparatus that has acquired the peculiar status of an inhuman agency – a subjectivized 
machine – that threatens to subsume our own subjectivity.  
Adorno’s polemics on cinema were rejected by many, perhaps because audiences 
are only too willing to be taken by the technical show; it is common, for example, to say 
that a film is absorbing, or a building hypnotic or compelling. Iconicity thus ensures the 
mystification of the commodity fetish, calling upon the subject to complete its ideological 
task. Mimesis is a technique of distraction, even while the spectator appears to be 
absorbed in the architecture. The term iconic, even in its posture as quasi-critique, 
reproduces this fundamental deception and thus remains uneasy and problematic, even as 
an object of inquiry here.  
Does the term “iconic” today mean something good or something bad? It is no 
doubt provocative, indeed too late to invoke the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, 
today, in an architectural culture that has been called “postcritical.” An examination of 
the theory of iconic architecture today, however lacking in development, reveals that 
those on both “sides” of the ideological divide – the “postcritical” camp and their 
opponents – maintain the exact same account of iconic architecture. They both believe 
that iconic architects are practicing some sort of vulgar “materialism” or pragmatism, 
appropriating Marx’s terminology toward formalist pursuits of exclusively technical 
means, a perverse materialism without intellectual engagement or concern for the social 
relations of digital architectural production. In short, the exact opposite of Marx’s 
concept of materialism, but I will return to this later. 




This definition of iconic architecture as a materialist, pragmatic, realist enterprise 
would not be so remarkable but for the fact that it is inaccurate. While it is thought that 
iconic architecture derives from a theory of empirical reality – in its adherence to the 
digital, the virtual, to the transcendence of the mimetic image – it can be situated within 
the philosophical tradition of German idealism, namely, the work of Hegel, Fichte, and 
Schelling. If iconic architecture’s basic tenet is the digital Geist immanent in the material 
building, it is also a return to Platonism – by way of Hegel’s Neoplatonism – where the 
digital spirit resides in built material and shares in its status of reality. Like geometric 
bodies in Plato’s theory of Forms,7 the built form is a mere contingent in relation to the 
higher digital “idea” or “form”;8 the virtual space, in Plato’s terms, is “absolute and 
eternal and immutable,”9 supremely real, and independent of ordinary objects whose 
traits and very existence derive from “participation . . . in the ideas by resemblance.”10 It 
must be emphasized that the question here is not one of epistemic status; rather, it is the 
veneration of digital reality that gives the iconic project its Hegelian slant. The original in 
this architectural paradigm is the digital abstraction, the highest code and truth that 
dictates everything the final building can and cannot do and be. Iconic architecture, in its 
sheer mimetic genius – the conception of architecture as a pure mind capable of 
performing mathematical operations – succeeds in attaining the absolute limit of human 
cognition where higher thought of the human mind is taken up by the digital routine, 
continuing Hegel’s idealist project for ahistorical truths (free of subjects, contingency, 
and history). 
The immediate consequence of this Hegelian model is that the closer the plastic 
surface gets to the digital image, the more it renounces corporeal existence.11 Even as 




iconic architecture appears to master reality, it shuts reality down: it reduces architectural 
experience to mathematics and digital processualism, to what is immediately apparent 
and yet held at bay. Like any good commodity, it promises but does not fulfill. The 
computerization of the design process seeks to dispel any humanistic, mythological, or 
romantic dimension that might attach to the plastic surface – to ensure that the purity of 
formal and material plasticity is not compromised by feeling or thought. But it thereby 
turns realism and pragmatism into myth, enchanted fact. The lesson of Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment – the violent operation of enlightenment values 
in modern culture – jumps to life in the workings of the iconic architecture industry.  
The hypostatization of digital space produces a systemic “alienation,” 
transforming social relations in the city into commodities through capital’s intervention 
via the aesthetic image. While the transaction reduces the subject to a commodity relation 
– the tourist is one example – the building itself becomes a “subject.” Adorno’s critique 
of film is all the more relevant to architecture today, because, like the filmgoer, the 
architectural spectator is complicit in this process of alienation through his or her 
investment in the iconic object.  
*  *  * 
The problem of alienation is one that Frank Gehry is entirely conscious of, attuned to the 
unreal relationship between the building he conceived and the postindustrial city of 
Bilbao and its residents. Discussing the museum with filmmaker Sydney Pollack, Gehry 
said, “You know, I went there just before the opening, and looked at it and said, Oh my 
God, what have I done to these people? I couldn’t look at the Guggenheim building at 
first, I was self-conscious about it. It took me two years to get used to it.”12 Inevitably, 




the architect has a morbid desire to look at the building, to enter into an encounter with 
the digital object that is now too real. Yet Gehry’s encounter with Bilbao – the real, 
situated building – belies his social estrangement, the Entfremdung in the iconic work to 
which he nonetheless remains chained. The Guggenheim Bilbao represents architecture’s 
deepest fantasy realized, made real (which, as Lacan teaches us, is a terrifying 
experience). A reflective surface is required to produce the gaze, the architect’s fantasy 
that stares back at the spectator and at Gehry himself.  
If the gaze is modern architecture itself as ahistorical myth – had history been 
purified and modernity rendered successful, made a “complete” project – Bilbao is the 
apotheosis of the iconic project because it materializes the false continuity of modernity 
in an uninterrupted, Moebius-like strip. (It speaks of the primal fantasy of modernism as a 
pure, infinitely continuous, and unadulterated present.) Like Faust, however, the city of 
Bilbao had to make a sacrifice in exchange for Gehry’s iconic building: the promise of 
Bilbao is the “magic” or higher sentience that derives from the insertion of iconic 
architecture – the “Bilbao effect.” But the offering of such an object and its processes of 
reification invariably create what Marcel Mauss called an object debt that has to be repaid 
by its recipient, as the failed attempts to create a viable economy for Bilbao and the 
Basque Country would surely prove, long before Spain’s present financial crisis. In order 
to respond to Adorno’s critique and go beyond the discourse of the mimetic image, a 
proper Marxist, i.e. dialectical-materialist, account of buildings such as Bilbao is 
necessary.  
The Guggenheim Bilbao project was part of Spain’s larger development efforts 
for cities that had undergone decades of financial atrophy after deindustrialization began 




in the 1970s.13 With the inauguration of the museum in 1997 and the revenue it 
generated, the redevelopment of the Abandoibarra district – the city’s former port – was 
widely received as a success of postindustrial capitalism. Yet, as the region’s only 
international draw, the Bilbao development failed its larger ambition to transform the city 
into a regional node in the European Union based on a restructured economic base. The 
city eventually forfeited its most significant functions to the more dynamic metropolises 
of Barcelona and Madrid, and Bilbao became a shell, like the city’s former abandoned 
factories.14 
The museum did, however, succeed in converting the city into an image; in its 
own abused syntax it put the city “on the map.” Though this image draws tourists to 
Bilbao every year, the city’s own citizens have vanished (the real Bilbao effect that is 
never discussed). The continuing population exodus exposes the deep rift between capital 
and social reality created by the industry of iconic architecture, whose real purpose is the 
reawakening of a vanquished capital. In spite of this, the iconic architecture industry 
presses on: the stated goal of Bilbao Ría 2000, a nonprofit group devoted to revitalizing 
former industrial spaces around the city, continues to be the local and international 
promotion of “Bilbao’s new image as a postindustrial city.”15 Bilbao as pure image, as 
instrumentality, seeks to avoid the pain of modernity, to conceal its crisis or pathology. 
On this symbolic front the Bilbao project has succeeded – its image retains all the youth 
and vigour of 1997 – but in real terms, like all images, Bilbao is empty, a mere opiate of 
modernity.16  
What then does Bilbao, both the museum and the greater urban redevelopment it 
belongs to, tell us about capitalism and globalization today? Although the iconic project 




remains a principal technique of neoliberal globalization, Bilbao represents the failure of 
the iconic project to rebuild capital in the postindustrial European city. Developments 
like Bilbao were designed to structure our experience of the contemporary city through 
globalized capital. The very term globalization, however, no longer refers only to 
something desirable, to expansion, but also to its the opposite, to contraction, debt 
contagion, credit collapse, etc. In the face of the global debt crisis, the lessons of Bilbao 
are beginning to be learned; its premise – the injection of a building to treat an urban-
economic malady – has now been widely contested.17 Iconic architecture today is no 
longer a failed project on the side of global capital, but an emptying out of the 
architectural commodity. Having been made redundant by global capital, the architectural 
image no longer reifies capital but refers only to its empty self. It is in this sense that 
iconic architecture is in crisis.  
Iconicity is the first cause of architecture’s ideological complicity, because, like 
film, it enables the architectural image to operate as an advertisement for reality, seen 
through capitalism’s eyes. For architecture to become art – that is, deinstrumentalized, 
autonomous, and real – it must escape its bondage to mimetic formalism, to digital 
mimesis, and relinquish its ideological project of the architectural image as instrument for 
rebuilding capital – thereby renouncing false immediacy and intelligibility. Architecture 
becomes a willing participant in this exchange with capital, not because of its lack of 
integrity or “selling out,” as per the familiar rebuke – architecture is neither a passive 
agent nor “icon” of capitalism – but because the symbolic contract with capital directly 
serves the discipline’s unconscious project to return to modernity, to recapitalize 
modernism – the house of capitalism. To apply the dialectical-materialist critique of 




capitalism to modernist history, the Modern Movement expanded, like capitalism, to a 
certain stage and then developed internal contradictions until it collapsed. Architecture’s 
complexity lies in the refusal to confront its history, to lose this battle. But, for Adorno, 
art is precisely a witness to history, and for this reason the critique of iconic architecture 
needs to move beyond the orbit of the mimetic image. It must move from facile 
judgments about a building’s entertainment value to the historical meaning of iconic 
architecture, vis-à-vis its relationship with modernism, and to the subject’s encounter 
with modernity via the architectural object on the ground. 
 
The Negative Value of the Architectural Image 
Adorno’s work on the filmic image and negative dialectics had a profound influence on 
the course of architectural debate, particularly in Manfredo Tafuri’s polemics on the 
architectural image. In Theories and History of Architecture, Tafuri explores Bruno 
Zevi’s thesis on the “critical value” of the architectural image that negates the dominant 
aesthetic, a procedure that ultimately articulates the code that constitutes architectural 
history.18 Tafuri writes, “Every new architectural work is born in relation to a symbolic 
context created by preceding works . . . every architecture has its own critical nucleus.”19 
The deviation from the center, what Tafuri calls “infringement,” is not merely an empty 
stylistic battle but a “critical de-mythicization of the image.” Tafuri in fact suggests that 
the image is the correct instrument for critical historiography and that all critique 
functions at the level of the image. The critic in other words must construct an image in 
order to conduct critique. Arguably, the problem with this methodology is that as image it 
always opens itself up to remythicization. While an image can articulate the existing code 




through a “brutal contestation,” Tafuri argues that it cannot point out the reasons that 
have historically determined that code and its unconscious ideological content.20 For 
Adorno, on the other hand, the aesthetic image precisely reveals what is unconscious in 
society, the ideology of capital. 
 If the Guggenheim Bilbao is the critical nucleus of recent iconic architecture, it 
illustrates the codification of the dominant aesthetic, a building that was defined as a self-
replicating image in the concatenating, titanium-clad objects seen to be duplicating 
Bilbao in various parts of the world. This demonstrates the sheer power of Bilbao, as 
commodity and image, to conjure a chain readable by a public and to carry out the iconic 
project’s political ends. Bilbao established for the iconic project its code, and on this 
purely mythic and highly effective level, it situated the architect of iconicity in a peculiar 
ethical position, as if having openly surrendered aesthetic agency and integrity to the 
seriality of a particular type. 
What, then, has become of the iconic project since Bilbao? Does iconic 
architecture today propose a new history in relation to Bilbao, and if so, what does it 
teach us about architecture’s relationship with modernity now? Capitalism today looks 
nothing like it did in 1997, even if virtual reality is unadulterated by the new experiences 
of architecture and the city. We have only to look at the negative reception of some of 
Gehry’s recent works – works seen to have openly transgressed the code established by 
Bilbao – to gain insight into the late iconic project.21 Bad reviews are nothing new in 
architectural culture, but for Gehry, whose work has received so much adulation, an 
interesting question about authorship and critique arises. 




Perhaps because Gehry is not loquacious, having left all theoretical considerations 
of his work to others, he is often represented as a fugitive from the academy, infatuated 
with his own genius for producing dazzling forms and formalisms at the expense of 
theoretical substance (if there is such a thing). Yet Gehry did not become well-known and 
in demand because he is a mere inventor of populist forms. Rather, his work succeeds by 
inducing the spectator’s encounter with an architectural unconscious – that which cannot 
be spoken – and it is precisely in this passive or accidental mode, at the level of 
symptomatology and pure image, that Gehry’s work gains critical substance.  
Gehry’s design for a new business school at the University of Technology, 
Sydney (UTS), presented in 2010,22 is the celebrity architect’s first building in Australia, 
and is no doubt just cause for celebration. It is therefore somewhat ironic that the 
proposed 11-story tan-brick building, composed of five crinkly, yellow boxes, has been 
pejoratively named a “crushed brown-paper bag.” The east facade, to be made of a buff-
colored brick, refers to Sydney’s yellow-stone heritage, and produces an image entirely 
unlike the metallic building envelopes associated with Gehry and encoded in the iconic 
project since Bilbao. Gehry’s new proposal, caught between the twisted alleys and streets 
laid out in the postindustrial locale of Sydney’s Ultimo suburb, reaches for something 
else: its anguished folds are anti-spectacle and anti-aesthetic. The curvilinear use of 
masonry evokes a modern architecture, like the folded brickwork of the Amsterdam-
School, the postwar projects of Alvar Aalto – an architect Gehry openly identifies with 
and admires23 – or Thomas Jefferson’s serpentine brick walls. An apparently un-iconic 
building, it has nothing of the mimetic quality of Bilbao; it neither looks like a digital 
model nor does it exude the auratic gaze of Bilbao or any iconic titanium-clad object. By 




refusing mimesis, Gehry’s building envelope in Sydney reveals the precise conundrum 
about the tyranny and ubiquity of iconic architecture, just as it permits the facade to host 
the return of modernism in the digital age.24  
Australia is finally getting a Gehry, but not the Gehry it imagined. The problem is 
not one of parochialism, but one that is historically peculiar to the 21st century and a 
testament to the victory of the global iconic project at war with itself: namely, that 
Australia expected a more iconic and less contextual building. The design quite simply 
lacks what Max Weber called “charismatic authority,” or the jouissance of digital 
mimesis in the new millennium. But is this not pure poetic justice, a perversion of the 
Bilbao effect that reveals the Faustian nature of such an exchange?25  
Gehry has said that the distortion of the building envelope and the use of curved 
masonry in his work are ways of “humanizing modernism.”26 His quixotic refrain about 
the Sydney scheme, that “the building is crinkly because the hardest thing to do with 
modern architecture is to make it humane, so this is a modernism humanized,”27 suggests 
that he sees himself as a modern architect. As Gehry jerkily glanced the model’s surface 
with a green laser pointer while talking to a Sydney television reporter about modern 
architecture, it struck me that the east facade recalls the familiar film stills of the 1972 
demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe public housing project. The facade reads as two low-rise 
residential slabs stacked one atop the other – its square punched windows similar to those 
used in Minoru Yamasaki’s 1950s building – imploding in slow motion. At the same 
time, the static image of the new building envelope reveals that the historicized failure of 
modernism in the St. Louis footage is not as stable as it first appeared in the days of 
1960s sit-ins and protest movements. Rather, it speaks of a second plateau or demise of 




modernism. Yet any return is not to modernism as an avant-garde but to the fall of 
modernism as polemic, incarnated and cryogenically preserved in the Pruitt-Igoe image 
and its historical aftereffects. For there can be no real “end” to iconic architecture or to 
modernism (to which such images paradoxically both attest and deny); rather, what this 
reveals is the critical operation of the image in constructing architectural history. Here, in 
effect, is not a humanized modernism (which would reinstate the ego at the center of the 
system) but a historicized modernism that reveals something inhuman, the barbarous as 
an enduring modality of modernity. 
The demolition of Pruitt-Igoe was not the end of the Modern Movement, as 
Charles Jencks famously argued, but the moment that the critique of modernism as a 
destructive agent in the postwar city was flattened into an image. The power of the image 
is that it makes visible co-present and real arguments that are otherwise elusive and take 
place at various points in time. The image of a falling Pruitt-Igoe succeeded in converting 
modernism as ideological mirage into the fantasized collapse of a regime represented by 
the demolition of a housing estate – the house of modernism. The Pruitt-Igoe footage 
revealed the naked irreality of modern architecture’s favorite tropes – functionalism, 
liberation, progress, purity – just as it concretized and visualized the hijacking of 
subjectivity, inhabitation, and life itself under modern architecture.  
In the architectural image Gehry has made for Sydney, the processes of 
historicizing modernism become the object of critique. The successive folds evoke the 
contorted relationship with the Modern Movement as history and the obsessive mourning 
of its loss. Gehry’s facade responds to the ahistorical myth of modernity that endures in 
today’s iconic project, shifting the gaze back to what is teleological and historical in the 




present moment. If we extend this reading to its limit, Bilbao and UTS propose two 
historiographic accounts. The collapsing UTS facade suggests a dialectical materialist 
approach to history, in which modernism in architecture grew to a state of maximum 
efficiency, then developed internal conflicts that led to its systematic decay. This is an 
essentially diachronic reading of history. The tragic image of self-destruction – a 
“termite’s nest,” as one critic called it – recalls the corruption of modernity as a project in 
class conflict. Bilbao, on the other hand, is a synchronic reading, its method of Hegelian 
idealism considers contemporary architecture an isolated product of the zeitgeist, of an 
ahistorical pure present. Its Neoplatonist formula of modernity – as the infinite plasticity 
of the metallic surface subjectivized by the digital Geist – promises the spectator a 
liberation from negative thought, from history itself.28  
Yet, it would be a mistake to think that the UTS building is a Marxian 
transformation of Bilbao or of the iconic project into materialist dialectics, because the 
new proposal remains within the orbit of an image that reproduces the original myth, a 
magical idea separated from the social struggle that was its first cause – which leads to 
the misrecognition of the facade. We cannot accept the critique of history in the hands of 
iconic architecture, however, as the UTS design betrays a nostalgia for the collapse of 
modernity, even while it remains disenchanted. So close then is iconic architecture in 
Adorno’s account to the “primeval myth of modernity from whose embrace it has 
wrested itself that its own lived past becomes a mythical prehistory.”29 Iconic architecture 
seeks to neutralize this mythical prehistory in buildings such as Bilbao, but it never 
relinquishes the fantasy of a return to the battlefield. (Paradoxically, the very desire to 




reinstate polemical modernism is to elude “modernism” in its purest, most essential, 
conceptual form.) 
What sets the contemporary version of this paradox apart is the troubling sense of 
retroaction in architectural culture today, the sense of an urgent need to rebuild ex nihilo, 
not only in projects such as the World Trade Center, but also in the global project to 
rebuild capital itself (to recapitalize modernity). Yet the UTS building does not seek any 
such catharsis; its very ugliness reflects what is grotesque about the return to the 
beginning of modernism, to the Garden of Eden prior to expulsion. This is the debt of 
contemporary architecture today. Like the Athenian play, the Sydney facade is “tragic” in 
the true sense of the dramatic form which was based on the protagonist’s reversal of 
fortune through a fatal error. To have invested so profoundly in a movement associated 
with barbarism and the decline of civilization, as the international modern movement did, 
creates a trauma, which Freud defined as an injury that does not fade but intensifies over 
time. In this sense there can be no catharsis in iconic architecture, because the problems 
of social existence cannot be solved through the transaction of myth and objecthood. 
Gehry does not provide an answer to the post-1968 lamentation, but what his late 
architecture accomplishes is the demythologization of the iconic project, if only for a 
fading moment. With this folded envelope, Gehry thus makes historical the experiences 
of contemporary architecture.  
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